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TENTH CIRCUIT ANTITRUST LAW: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
AND POSSIBLE FUTURE TRENDS
WILLIAM E. MOOZ, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The nation's principal antitrust laws were enacted over a century
ago. Since then, the sophistication of our economy has increased, re-
quiring the application of antitrust laws to a variety of circumstances that
were not contemplated by the drafters. Economic thinking has also
changed during this time, and many types of conduct that were once
automatically considered anticompetitive are now considered to be
procompetitive. In the 1970's, these combined factors led to a revolu-
tion in antitrust jurisprudence. Spearheaded by Robert Bork's The Anti-
trust Paradox,I courts began to subject antitrust claims to a heightened
level of scrutiny to foster the overriding goal of protecting consumer
welfare. This phase of the revolution produced substantial restrictions
on who had standing to sue,2 when vertical restraints would be declared
illegal per se,3 and even when horizontal collusion would be
condemned.
4
The revolution gathered momentum during the 1980's with both
the federal courts (including the Tenth Circuit) and the Department of
Justice leading the charge. Some of the areas most affected during this
decade include: (a) standing;5 (b) market and monopoly power;6 and (c)
the concerted action requirement of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act.7 As we enter the 1990's, the movement is going strong and there
are indications that Congress may join the movement. This Article ex-
amines the Tenth Circuit's most recent decisions in some of the charged
areas of the past decade and discusses the course of future
developments.
II. ANTITRUST STANDING
"Antitrust standing" differs from Article III standing. Article III
* William E. Mooz, Jr., Associate, Holland & Hart, Denver, CO; B.A. 1981, Colo-
rado College; J.D. 1985, University of Colorado School of Law.
1. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A PoLIcY AT WAR wrrIH ITSELF (1978).
2. E.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
3. E.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
4. E.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
5. E.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort, Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986); Associated Gen. Contrac-
tors, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983); see infra section II.
6. E.g., Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co. 472
U.S. 284 (1985); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984); see infra
section III.
7. E.g., Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988); Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite
Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984); see infra section IV.
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standing requires an injury in fact sufficient to satisfy the Constitution's
jurisdictional requirements. 8  Before a court can address antitrust
standing, it must first find the plaintiff has satisfied the Article III stand-
ing requirements. To demonstrate antitrust standing, the plaintiff must
subsequently show an injury within the zone of interests protected by
sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act. 9 These two sections respectively
provide private rights of action to seek damages and injunctive relief.10
A two-tiered process is used to show whether one falls within the zone of
interests protected by these sections. First, the plaintiff must demon-
strate an "antitrust injury," that is, an injury of the sort proscribed by
the antitrust laws. 1  Then, the plaintiff must show the action would be
brought in an efficient and effective manner. 12 This latter inquiry has
been labeled both the "standing" and the "proper plaintiff" require-
ment. The concepts of antitrust injury and proper plaintiff are closely
related and both must be satisfied.'
3
A. Antitrust Injury
Emphasis on antitrust injury began in the 1970's when the United
States Supreme Court voiced its concern that plaintiffs were using the
antitrust laws to stifle, rather than promote, competition. 14 Conse-
quently, the Court introduced the now-famous requirement that the
plaintiff demonstrate that the injury "flows from that which makes de-
fendants' acts unlawful."' 15 Under this standard, the plaintiff must show
that an activity prohibited by the antitrust laws, namely a reduction in
competition, caused the injury. Mere injury to a competitor 16 or "injury
which is merely causally linked in some way to an alleged antitrust viola-
tion" will not suffice. 17 The Tenth Circuit has applied the antitrust in-
jury requirement consistently since the late 1970's' 8 and its recent
8. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (1988).
10. See generally Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 109-11 (1986). The Tenth
Circuit has yet to take a position on whether the absence of antitrust standing can be
waived by the parties. Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 899 F.2d 951, 961-62
(10th Cir.)(noting split between circuits and declining to take a position), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 3241 (1990).
11. E.g., Cargill, 479 U.S. at 109-11 & n.6 (1986). This standard applies to the plaintiff
who seeks damages. A plaintiff who seeks injunctive relief only need demonstrate a threat
of antitrust injury. l
12. Id. at 122.
13. See generally Reazin, 899 F.2d at 960 ("Standing and antitrust injury are essential
elements in a private antitrust damages action brought under section 4 of the Clayton
Act."); Board of Regents v. NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147, 1151 (10th Cir. 1983) (antitrust injury
and standing issues treated as identical), aff'd, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
14. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977).
15. l at 489; accord Holly Sugar Corp. v. Goshen County Coop. Beet Growers Ass'n,
725 F.2d 564, 567-68 (10th Cir. 1984).
16. Injury to a competitor may be enough to vest the plaintiff with standing to sue
under the Robinson-Patman Act. See, e.g., Alan's, Inc. v. Minolta Corp., 903 F.2d 1414,
1418 n.6, 1427 (11 th Cir. 1990)(cataloging the debate on this point).
17. Reazin, 899 F.2d at 962 n.15; see, e.g., Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 487.
18. See Natrona Serv., Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 598 F.2d 1294, 1297-98 (10th Cir.
1979)(citing Brunswick, 429 U.S. 477); Farnell v. Albuquerque Publishing Co., 589 F.2d
497, 501 (10th Cir. 1978).
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decisions show no indication of change.' 9
B. Proper Plaintiff
During the 1980's, the Court took the teachings of Brunswick Corp. v.
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.20 one step further by ruling that, even if the
plaintiff demonstrates antitrust injury, standing still may be denied for
reasons of efficiency.2 1 The plaintiff must demonstrate an ability to
prosecute the action in an efficient and effective manner. The Supreme
Court set out somewhat conflicting standards for making this analysis.
In Associated General Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council of
Carpenters,22 the Court formulated a laundry list of factors to consider.
These factors, as summarized by the Tenth Circuit, include the
following:
1. "the directness or indirectness of the connection between
the plaintiff's injury and the allegedly unlawful market
restraint;"
2. "the speculativeness of the plaintiff's damages;"
3. "'the 'risk of duplicative recoveries . . .or the danger of
complex apportionment of damages[;]'" and
4. "the defendant's intent[.]
' '23
The Court cautioned that, although these factors are to be applied on a
case-by-case basis, competitors and direct consumers24 will be the only
parties likely to satisfy the inquiry.
25
Just one year earlier, the Court set out a more nebulous and lenient
19. See Instructional Sys. Dev. Corp. v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co., 817 F.2d 639,
650 (10th Cir. 1987); Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509,
1522-23 (10th Cir. 1984), af'd, 472 U.S. 585 (1985); cf. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort, Inc., 479
U.S. 104, 113-22 (1986)(reversing Tenth Circuit for failing to require a showing of im-
pending antitrust injury in proceeding for injunctive relief).
20. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
21. The genesis of this second requirement actually occurred in 1977 when the Court
held that indirect purchasers did not have standing in all but the most exceptional cases,
even though they clearly had suffered antitrust injury. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S.
720 (1977). This situation-specific decision did not evolve into a general principle of
standing until 1983. See generally Cargill, 479 U.S. at 110 n.5 ("A showing of antitrust injury
is necessary, but not always sufficient, to establish standing under § 4 [of the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988)], because a party may have suffered antitrust injury but may not be a
proper plaintiff under § 4 for other reasons.")(citing William H. Page, The Scope of Liability
for Antitrust iolations, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1445, 1483-85 (1985)); Associated Gen. Contrac-
tors, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983).
22. 459 U.S. 519, 543-44 (1983).
23. Reazin, 899 F.2d at 962 n.15 (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 544).
This formulation of the Associated Gen. Contractors criteria differs from that of some other
circuits. Compare Reazin, 899 F.2d at 962 n.15 (listing defendant's intent as a factor) with
Adams v. Pan Am. World Airways, 828 F.2d 24, 26 & n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (intent is an
element of the offense and not a factor to be considered in the standing analysis), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988).
24. Indirect purchasers stand virtually no chance of being proper plaintiffs under any
analysis. See, e.g., Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 735-36 (indirect purchaser cannot bring anti-
trust claim unless it has a preexisting cost-plus contract with the direct purchaser); In re
Wyoming Tight Sands Antitrust Cases, 866 F.2d 1286, 1290 (10th Cir. 1989)(same), af'd,
110 S. Ct. 2807 (1990).
25. See Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 537-45.
19921
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
standard in Blue Shield v. McCready.2 6 In McCready, the Court found that
standing exists where the plaintiff's injury is inextricably intertwined
with or an integral aspect of the illegal plot.2 7 Contrary to its intima-
tions in Associated General Contractors, the Court specifically stated that
persons who are neither competitors nor consumers may be able to
make this showing.2 8 A number of courts have resolved this conflict by
eschewing McCready (at least implicidtly) in favor of the Associated General
Contractors factors.
29
The Tenth Circuit's most recent standing decision, Reazin v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield,30 takes a contrary approach. The court indicated that
McCready, rather than Associated General Contractors, predominantly gov-
erns the determination of who is a proper plaintiff. In Reazin, the Tenth
Circuit made no attempt to reconcile the holdings of Associated General
Contractors and McCready. Rather, it unceremoniously buried the Associ-
ated General Contractors factors in a footnote without discussion or any
attempt to apply them to the facts of the case.3 1 This task left uncom-
pleted, the court turned almost exclusively to the nebulous statements
in McCready and declared that the plaintiffs had standing.
3 2
The court in Reazin may well have reached the right result, but its
analytical path is a troubling one. The plaintiffs were at least perceived
competitors of the defendant and, in all likelihood, could have satisfied
the Associated General Contractors factors had they been put to the task by
the Tenth Circuit. The court did not need to bury Associated General to
reach its result, and its failure to discuss the Associated General Contractors
factors or to explain why it was not applying them creates confusion as
to how it may act in future cases. Given the plaintiffs' apparent ability to
satisfy the Associated General Contractors factors, and the court's failure to
repudiate the factors overtly, Reazin probably should not be read as plac-
ing the Associated General Contractors analysis beyond resurrection in the
Tenth Circuit.
III. MARKET POWER
The area of antitrust law most affected by the events of the past two
decades is market power analysis. In 1977, the Court thrust the concept
of market power into the limelight when it examined challenges to non-
price vertical restraints under the rule of reason and effectively required
a market power analysis in all such cases.3 3 Then in the 1980's, the
Court took aim at a number of types of horizontal restraints, holding
them free from per se condemnation unless defendants were first shown
26. 457 U.S. 465 (1982).
27. Id. at 479, 484.
28. Id. at 472.
29. See, e.g., Adams v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 828 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1987)(rig-
orously applying Associated Gen. Contractors criteria), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988).
30. 899 F.2d 951 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3241 (1990).
31. Id. at 962 n.15.
32. Id. at 962-63.
33. Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977).
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to have market power.3 4 This increasing emphasis on market power
means virtually all antitrust cases now require some showing of market
power.3 5 As we enter the 1990's, all courts, including the Tenth Circuit,
are grappling with how to define and measure market power.
A. Definition of Market Power and Monopoly Power
The Tenth Circuit defines market power as "'the ability to raise
prices above those that would be charged in a competitive market.' ",36
Market power differs from monopoly power in that market power exists
where the defendant has the power to either exclude competitors or con-
trol prices, while the defendant with monopoly power is able to do
both.37 Simply put, monopoly power is substantial market power.
3 8
The Tenth Circuit's definition, though, does not reflect its actual mean-
ing or practice. Virtually every firm has some ability to raise prices with-
out losing all of its customers. When a firm has a downward sloping
demand curve, some increase in price will be accepted by customers
before they seek substitute products. Almost all firms have a downward
sloping demand curve. Similarly, virtually every firm has some ability to
exclude competitors, because, as a practical matter, the cost of entering
and exiting a market rarely is zero. Thus, when applied literally, the
Tenth Circuit's tests-similar to those used in all other circuits-are
meaningless.
3 9
The real focus of the Tenth Circuit and other circuits is the degree of
the defendant's market power.40 A defendant's market power threatens
34. See, e.g., Northwest Wholesale Stationers Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co.,
472 U.S. 284, 294-95 (1985)(group boycott); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde,
466 U.S. 2, 12-18 (1984)(tying arrangements); Smith Mach. Co. v. Hesston Corp., 878
F.2d 1290, 1295-98 (10th Cir. 1989)(line forcing), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1073 (1990). But cf.
Reazin v. Blue Gross & Blue Shield, 899 F.2d 951, 968 n.24 (10th Cir.)(absence of market
power will not justify a naked restriction on price or output absent some competitive justi-
fication), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3241 (1990).
35. See, e.g., Bright v. Moss Ambulance Serv., Inc., 824 F.2d 819, 823 (10th Cir.
1987)(monopolization); Westman Comm'n Co. v. Hobart Int'l, Inc., 796 F.2d 1216, 1229
(10th Cir. 1986)(vertical refusal to deal), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1005 (1988); Shoppin' Bag of
Pueblo, Inc. v. Dillon Cos., Inc., 783 F.2d 159, 161-63 (10th Cir. 1986)(attempt to monop-
olize).
It is unclear to what extent Robinson-Patman claims have been affected by this devel-
opment. Compare Alan's, Inc. v. Minolta Corp., 903 F.2d 1414, 1418 n.6 (11th Cir.
1990)(ability to injure a single competitor is all that law requires in Robinson-Patman case)
with Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 837 F.2d 1127, 1143-44 (StarrJ.) and 1149-1152 (Wil-
liams, J., concurring)(D.C. Cir. 1988)(Robinson-Patman Act requires showing of injury to
competition and market power).
36. Westman Comm'n, 796 F.2d at 1225 (quoting NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109 n.38 (1984)); see also Reazin, 899 F.2d at 966-67.
37. Reazin, 899 F.2d at 967; Key Fin. Planning Corp. v. 17T Life Ins. Corp., 828 F.2d
635, 643 (10th Cir. 1987); Bright, 824 F.2d at 824; Westman Comm'n, 796 F.2d at 1225;
Shoppin' Bag, 783 F.2d at 163-64.
38. Bacchus Indus., Inc. v. Arvin Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 887, 894 (10th Cir. 1991);
Reazin, 899 F.2d at 967.
39. All of the circuits' tests for market and monopoly power emanate from the Court's
holding in United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956), that
"[mionopoly power is the power to control prices or exclude competition."
40. See, e.g., Reazin, 899 F.2d at 966-72; PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTi-
19921
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to injure competition only when it is substantial. Unfortunately, Tenth
Circuit law currently provides little guidance as to when a firm's power is
substantial enough to be troubling. The point at which "market power"
graduates to "monopoly power" is even less clear. Hopefully, the Tenth
Circuit will act during the 1990's to provide more guidance in this area.
One possibility would be to adopt the test for market power contained
in the Department of'Justice's merger guidelines: Does the firm in ques-
tion have sufficient power that it can profitably raise its prices by 5% for
more than a transitory period of time?
4 1
B. The Relevant Market
The first step in evaluating a firm's market power is to define the
relevant market.4 2 This is a question of fact.43 The relevant market has
two elements-the relevant product market and the relevant geographic
market.4 4 Each is defined by analyzing the market from the perspective
of the buyer and not the seller.4 5 The relevant product market includes
all products that are" 'reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the
same purposes.'"46 Exactly where to draw the line between including
or excluding a product is unclear, since rarely are different products per-
fect substitutes for one another. The Tenth Circuit, quite properly, di-
rects its focus to the cross-elasticities of demand for the various
products47 but has not stated what degree of elasticity is required to
justify including a product in the market. The court may well be per-
suaded by the elasticity standard set out in the Department of Justice
Merger Guidelines: The product market includes all products that con-
sumers would turn to when faced with a non-transitory five percent in-
crease in the price of the defendant's product.4 8
TRUST LAw, 505 (1978)("The significance of market power depends not only on its de-
gree but also on its durability.")
41. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,103,
§ 2.11 (June 14, 1984) [hereinafter DOJ Guidelines]. Because the Tenth Circuit's current
test for market power follows that mandated by the Supreme Court in duPont, it probably
would have to treat the merger guidelines as a mere method for applying the current test
in order to preserve the fiction that duPont still controls.
42. E.g., Bacchus, 939 F.2d at 893 ("Without a definition of the relevant market for the
product involved, there is no way to measure the defendant's ability to lessen or destroy
competition.") (citing Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S.
172 (1965)).
43. Westman Comm'n Co. v. Hobart Int'l Inc., 796 F.2d 1216, 1220 (10th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1005 (1988); Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738
F.2d 1509, 1514 (10th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 472 U.S. 585 (1985); Telex Corp. v. International
Bus. Machs. Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 915 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975).
44. Bacchus, 939 F.2d at 893; see also Westman Comm'n, 796 F.2d at 1221-22.
45. See Westman Comm'n, 796 F.2d at 1221; Key Fin. Planning Corp. v. ITT Life Ins.
Corp., 828 F.2d 635, 643 (10th Cir. 1987).
46. Westman Comm'n, 796 F.2d at 1221 (quoting United States v. E.I. duPont de
Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956)); accord Bacchus, 939 F.2d at 893; Telex Corp., 510
F.2d at 917; see Key Fin., 828 F.2d at 643.
47. Westman Comm'n, 796 F.2d at 1220-21.
48. DOJ Guidelines, supra note 41. See also National Association of Attorneys General
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,405, § 3.1 (Mar. 10, 1987)
[hereinafter NAAG Guidelines] ("A comparably priced substitute will be deemed suitable
[Vol. 69:4
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As a second element, the relevant "geographic market is the nar-
rowest market which is wide enough so that products from adjacent ar-
eas ... cannot compete on substantial parity with those included in the
market."'49 Evidence of how far consumers are willing to travel to ob-
tain the product at a lower price will be significant.50 This approach,
similar to that employed by all other circuits, 5 1 is fact-intensive.
C. Proving Market Power and Monopoly Power
Once the market is properly defined, the parties then attempt to
prove or disprove the existence of market power. Market power is typi-
cally determined by estimating the defendant's market share. Next, the
structural characteristics of the market establish whether that market
share allows a rise in price for a nontransitory period of time without
loss of so many customers that the price increase becomes unprofitable.
In Reazin, however, the Tenth Circuit suggested a deviation from the
typical analysis in two potentially significant ways.
First, the Tenth Circuit indicated that the strength of the showing of
market power may vary with the nature of the challenged restraint.
5 2
The more naked the restraint, the less elaborate need be the analysis of
market power. Second, the court stated that detailed proof that the de-
fendant possessed market power may not be necessary if substantial evi-
dence indicates the defendant in fact exercised market power.53 In other
words, if it is clear that output has been reduced and prices raised, there
is no need to debate whether the defendant has the power to accomplish
such results.
The significance of these statements is difficult to assess, however,
because the Reazin court ultimately applied a traditional market power
analysis. These statements also apparently conflict with the Tenth Cir-
cuit's subsequent proclamation that "'[a]t the very least it must be
shown how much of the relevant market a defendant controls if market
power is to be evaluated.' "54 This latter statement appears to apply
orily to cases of monopolization or attempt to monopolize where the
plaintiff must demonstrate monopoly power or a likelihood that the de-
fendant will obtain monopoly power. Such cases face higher standards
and thereby expand the product market definition if, and only if, considered suitable by at
least 75% of [the customers who purchase the particular product in question.]")
49. Westman Comm'n, 796 F.2d at 1222 (internal quotations omitted); see also Bacchus,
939 F.2d at 893 ("geographic market consists of the area of effective competition").
50. See Westman Comm'n, 796 F.2d at 1222.
51. See, e.g., Satellite Television & Associated Resources, Inc. v. Continental Cablevi-
sion, Inc., 714 F.2d 351, 356 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1027 (1984); LAWRENCE
A. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANrrrusT § 12 (1977).
52. Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 899 F.2d 951, 966, 968 n.24 (10th Cir.), cerl.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 3241 (1990).
53. Id at 968 n.24 (quoting FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460-61
(1986)).
54. Bacchus Indus., Inc. v. Arvin Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 887, 894 (10th Cir.
1991)(quoting Shoppin' Bag of Pueblo, Inc. v. Dillon Cos., Inc., 783 F.2d 159, 161-62
(10th Cir. 1986)).
1992]
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than the mere existence of market power required in a Sherman Act
section 1 case.
In the Tenth Circuit, like all others, the traditional market power
inquiry begins with an analysis of the defendant's market share. Market
share provides important, but not conclusive, evidence of market
power.55 A low market share gives rise to a presumption that market (or
monopoly) power does not exist and a high market share creates the
opposite presumption. 5 6 In addition to market share, the Tenth Circuit
considers how the structural characteristics of the relevant market may
impact upon a firm's ability to exercise power. These factors include:
trends in the market; barriers to entry; the substitutability of other avail-
able products; the number and strength of existing and potential com-
petitors; 5 7 the cross elasticity of demand for the relevant product; and
regulatory or contractual limits on the amount or duration of the de-
fendant's power.
5 8
Under current economic thinking, barriers to entry are by far the
most important of these factors, because, in their absence, one can ex-
pect potential entrants to flood the market if the defendant restricts out-
put or raises prices. Barriers to entry can take many forms, including:
high capital costs; 59 regulatory or legal requirements such as patents or
licenses; control over an essential or superior resource; entrenched
buyer preferences; and capital market evaluations imposing higher capi-
tal costs on new entrants.60 These various structural characteristics can
enhance or diminish a firm's market power.6 1 Which effect they have, if
any, is determined by a fact-specific examination.
55. Bacchus, 939 F.2d at 894; Reazin, 899 F.2d at 967; Shoppin'Bag, 783 F.2d at 162; see
Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 885 F.2d 683, 695 n.20 (10th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 441 (1990).
56. Reazin, 899 F.2d at 968 ("market share percentages may give rise to presumptions,
but will rarely conclusively establish or eliminate market or monopoly power"); Colorado
Interstate Gas, 885 F.2d at 694 n.18 (monopoly power generally will not exist absent a mar-
ket share of at least 70% to 80%).
57. One factor that the Tenth Circuit has yet to consider is the impact of actual or
potential competition from abroad. The practical approach taken by the court in Reazin
indicates that the Tenth Circuit will evaluate such claims (which often carry a tinge of
xenophobia) closely and not overlook the very real difficulties that foreign competitors
may have in entering the domestic market, such as transportation costs, tariffs and other
regulatory barriers, exchange rate fluctuations, etc.
58. See, e.g., Bacchus, 939 F.2d at 894; Reazin, 899 F.2d at 968-72; Colorado Interstate Gas,
885 F.2d at 694-96 & n.21; Westman Comm'n Co. v. Hobart Int'l, Inc., 796 F.2d 1216,
1226 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1005 (1988).
59. High capital costs should be considered a barrier to entry only to the extent that
they cannot be recouped if the firm decides to exit the market. For example, the need to
invest in a fleet of trucks is not likely to create a serious barrier to entry into the widget
market because trucks are readily available and can be sold or rented to persons other than
the competing widget manufacturers in the event that the new entrant does not succeed.
An investment in a custom piece of tooling machinery, by contrast, probably cannot be put
to any other use outside of the widget industry and would be a barrier to entry.
60. Reazin, 899 F.2d at 968 (quoting Colorado Interstate Gas, 885 F.2d at 695-96 n.21);
Westman Comm'n, 796 F.2d at 1225-26 n.3; SULLIVAN, supra note 51, 1 23; AREEDA & TUR-
NER, supra note 40, 409.
61. Compare Reazin, 899 F.2d at 966-68 (factors enhanced market power) with Colorado




The rigor of this examination in the Tenth Circuit has varied from
case to case. In Reazin, the court critically examined each of the factors
raised by the parties as potentially impacting the defendant's market
power. The court only gave weight to those factors proven to exist and
proven to have a significant effect on the defendart's ability to exercise
control over prices or to exclude competitors. 6 2 By contrast, the court's
examination in Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co.,63 was
cursory and purely theoretical. There, the court simply noted that con-
tractual terms limited the defendant's ability to exercise market power to
six years and held that this fact precluded any likelihood of the defend-
ant achieving monopoly power.64 The court's failure to consider the
defendant's power during that six-year period, which most authorities
consider to be more than transitory, 6 5 is highly surprising and unlikely
to be followed in other cases.
66
Reazin and Colorado Interstate Gas demonstrate that the Tenth Circuit
looks beyond market share to consider structural attributes of the mar-
ket impacting a defendant's ability to control prices or exclude competi-
tion. The degree of scrutiny placed on these purported power-
enhancing or power-reducing factors, however, is likely to vary from
case to case.
IV. CONSPIRACY-PROOF
The Supreme Court has long recognized that purely unilateral con-
duct does not violate section I of the Sherman Act.6 7 The requirement
of concerted action under sections 1 and 2, however, received unprece-
dented emphasis during the 1980's.68 As a result, plaintiffs find it much
more difficult to prove concerted action, an essential element of every
case brought under section 1 of the Sherman Act and of claims for con-
spiracy to monopolize under section 2. The Tenth Circuit has followed
the Supreme Court's lead in this area, and recent precedent indicates
that it will continue to do so-at least until Congress legislates
otherwise.
6 9
62. See Reazin, 899 F.2d at 968-72.
63. 885 F.2d 683 (10th Cir. 1986).
64. Id, at 695-97.
65. See, e.g., DOJ Guidelines, supra note 41, § 3.3 (potential entry won't be considered
unless it is likely to happen within two years); NAAG Guidelines, supra note 48, § 5.1 (po-
tential entry must occur within one year to be relevant).
66. The Department ofJustice has strongly criticized this aspect of the Colorado Inter-
state Gas opinion. See Amicus Curiae Brief of Department of Justice at 18-19, Colorado
Interstate Gas v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 885 F.2d 683 (10th Cir. 1989)(No. 89-1508),
cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 441 (1990).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
68. See Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988); Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Copperweld Corp. v. Inde-
pendence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465
U.S. 752 (1984).
69. See, e.g., Bacchus Indus., Inc. v. Arvin Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 887, 895 (10th Cir.
1991)(rejecting conspiracy to monopolize claim for failure to establish combination or
conspiracy); McKenzie v. Mercy Hosp., 854 F.2d 365, 367 (10th Cir. 19 88)("Solely unilat-
eral conduct, regardless of its anticompetitive effects, is not.prohibited by Section 1.");
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A. Capacity to Conspire
In 1984, the Supreme Court held a parent corporation legally inca-
pable of conspiring with its wholly-owned subsidiary because they were
under common control and, hence, merely a single actor for purposes of
antitrust analysis. 70 Its decision upheld a long line of Tenth Circuit pre-
cedent requiring a threshold demonstration that alleged conspirators
have the legal capacity to conspire for antitrust purposes. 7 1 The legal
capacity of particular parties to conspire with one another is a question
of fact hinging largely on the degree to which the parties are subject to a
common source of control. 7 2 Applying this analysis, the Tenth Circuit
has found the following parties legally incapable of conspiring with one
another: a company and its owner/president; 7 a real estate broker and
its sales agents where state law made their relationship one of superior
and subordinates; 74 economically integrated affiliated business enti-
ties;75 and an insurance company and insurance agents who were part of
the company structure.7 6 Recent Tenth Circuit precedent indicates this
line of decisions will continue to expand.
77
B. Proof Required
Recent Supreme Court decisions have also raised the showing a
plaintiff must make to establish the existence of concerted action.7 8 The
Tenth Circuit, in keeping with these developments, now employs a two-
pronged test to evaluate the plaintiff's evidence of concerted action:
(1) [I]s the plaintiff's evidence of conspiracy ambiguous, i.e., is
it as consistent with the defendants' permissible independent
interests as with an illegal conspiracy; and, if so, (2) is there any
evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that the defend-
ants were pursuing these independent interests.
79
Although this test was developed in the context of a motion for sum-
Blankenship v. Herzfeld, 661 F.2d 840, 845 (10th Cir. 1981)(rejecting claims under both
section 1 and section 2 for want of proof of concerted action).
Congress has considered legislation which would overturn much of the Court's recent
conspiracy decisions. See infra text accompanying notes 88-95.
70. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 752.
71. See, e.g., Card v. National Life Ins. Co., 603 F.2d 828, 834 (10th Cir. 1979).
72. See, e.g., Blankenship v. Herzfeld, 721 F.2d 306, 309 (10th Cir. 1983)(Blankenship
I/)(capacity of related parties to conspire is a question of fact).
73. United States v. Suntar Roofing, Inc., 897 F.2d 469, 474 (10th Cir. 1990)("the law
will not recognize a conspiracy when the only possible 'conspirators' are a company and its
employee, officer or owner")(citing Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 769).
74. Holter v. Moore & Co., 702 F.2d 854, 856 (10th Cir.) (recognizing that officers
and employees of corporation are generally incapable of conspiring with the corporation
or each other), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 937 (1983).
75. Blankenship II, 721 F.2d at 309-10.
76. Card, 603 F.2d at 834.
77. See Suntar Roofing, 897 F.2d at 474 (10th Cir. 1990)(following Copperweld, 467 U.S.
at 752).
78. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
79. Key Fin. Planning Corp. v. ITT Life Ins. Corp., 828 F.2d 635, 639 (10th Cir.
1987)(quoting Gibson v. Greater Park City Co., 818 F.2d 722, 724 (10th Cir. 1987)).
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mary judgment,8 0 it comes into play at the motion to dismiss stage and
at trial as well. 8 ' This test makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to prove
concerted action by way of circumstantial evidence due to its susceptib-
lity of ambiguious or differing inferences.8 2 This does not mean, how-
ever, that circumstantial evidence never can suffice to establish the
requisite concerted action.83 The plaintiff should expect to come for-
ward with at least some direct evidence, which can be supplemented by
logical inferences, in order to establish concerted action.8 4
C. Types of Concerted Action Required
In addition to tightening the quantum of proof required to establish
conspiracies, recent Supreme Court precedent further narrows the types
of conspiracy that will satisfy the concerted action requirement.8 5 The
Tenth Circuit has carried this trend even further. For example, in Mc-
Kenzie v. Mercy Hospital,8 6 a tying claim brought under section 1 was dis-
missed for lack of concerted action even though the alleged tying
arrangement constituted a contract that many circuits consider within
the ambit of section l's requirement of a "contract, combination or con-
spiracy" in restraint of trade.87 The extent to which this trend continues
80. l.
81. See Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 899 F.2d 951, 963-64 (10th Cir.)(trial),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3241 (1990); Monument Builders v. American Cemetery Ass'n, 891
F.2d 1473, 1481 n.8 (10th Cir. 1989)(motion to dismiss), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2168
(1990).
82. See Cayman Exploration Corp. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 873 F.2d 1357, 1361
(10th Cir. 1989)(conspiracy can be established by circumstantial evidence, but parallel
business behavior alone is not enough and claim of conspiracy "will fail if there is an
independent business justification which explains the alleged conspirators' conduct");
Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc., 850 F.2d 1373, 1380 (10th Cir. 1988)(evidence at
best ambiguous and consistent with defendants' permissible interests); Key Fin., 828 F.2d
at 639-40 (evidence ambiguous and equally indicative of legitimate conduct); Gibson, 818
F.2d at 724-25 (each action cited subject to plausible nonconspiratorial explanation).
Compare with the earlier cases of King & King Enters. v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 657
F.2d 1147, 1153 (10th Cir. 1981)(conspiracy may be inferred from course of conduct and
other circumstantial evidence), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982); Cackling Acres, Inc. v.
Olson Farms, Inc., 541 F.2d 242,244-45 (10th Cir. 1976)(same), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1122
(1977).
83. See Reazin, 899 F.2d at 963-64 (circumstantial evidence of conspiracy sufficient to
support jury's finding of conspiracy); Monument Builders, 891 F.2d at 1481 n.8 ("The Court
did not intend to end reliance on circumstantial proof of conspiracy, but rather to avoid
reliance exclusively on evidence which is as consistent with permissible competition as
with illegal conspiracy.") (internal quotation omitted).
84. See United States v. Suntar Roofing, Inc., 897 F.2d 469, 474-77 (10th Cir.
1990)(upholding finding of conspiracy at trial based on mixture of direct and circumstan-
tial evidence); Instructional Sys. Dev. Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 817 F.2d 639,
644-46 (10th Cir. 1987)(direct evidence supported by logical inference sufficient to estab-
lish conspiracy).
85. See, e.g., Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988)(plaintiff
must show that defendants agreed not only that plaintiff should be terminated for dis-
counting, but also that they acted jointly to set the prices or price levels that were being
enforced).
86. 854 F.2d 365 (10th Cir. 1988).
87. Id. at 367-68; see also Smith Mach. Co. v. Hesston Corp., 878 F.2d 1290, 1294-95,
1298-99 (10th Cir. 1989) (indicating that court may have been willing to dismiss tying claim
on this basis had it been raised by the defendant and later finding general dealership
agreement containing line forcing requirement to be insufficient to establish a "contract
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is likely to be determined by the Supreme Court or Congress.
V. FUTURE TRENDS
Virtually all of the recent developments in antitrust jurisprudence
stem from actions taken by the Supreme Court. In its handful of annual
antitrust opinions, the Court has steered antitrust jurisprudence down a
fairly predictable path that emphasizes economic efficiency over just
about all else. Recent appointments to the Court indicate that it will not
deviate from this course.
88
But antitrust jurisprudence can move in directions other than those
mandated by the Supreme Court. Congress, in theory at least, retains
the power to reset the course of the law. Since the 1970's, certain mem-
bers of Congress have attempted to derail the antitrust revolution, albeit
unsuccessfully. In 1991, the Senate passed just such a bill, S. 429,89
which would reverse cases like Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics
Corp.90 and Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.9 1 and make it easier
for plaintiffs in vertical restraint cases to establish the concerted action
element of section 1 of the Sherman Act, and reaffirm the per se invalid-
ity of resale price maintenance arrangements.
While S. 429 mirrors many of the earlier "turn back the dock" bills,
its counterpart in the House, H.R. 1470,92 indicates that Congress' ap-
proach to antitrust law may be turning in the same direction as the
Court's. Like S. 429, H.R. 1470 contains provisions directed at making
it easier to establish section l's concerted action requirement. H.R.
1470, however, limits per se condemnation of resale price maintenance
to cases where defendants possess market power. These changes, if en-
acted into law, would keep the Supreme Court's antitrust jurisprudence
headed in the same direction, 1ut with a much firmer underpinning.
For years, leading antitrust jurists have felt that per se condemna-
tion of resale price maintenance was inconsistent with the policies un-
derlying the antitrust laws. 93 Long-standing precedent 9 4 and fear of a
congressional backlash operated to keep the courts from overtly aban-
doning per se condemnation in favor of the rule of reason. Instead,
courts covertly achieved this result by pushing section l's concerted ac-
tion requirement to contorted extremes.9 5 H.R. 1470, in its current
for sale" as required by section 3 of the Clayton Act), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1073 (1990); cf.
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984)(indicating that contract im-
posing tie on the purchaser is also sufficient to satisfy Section 1).
88. See, for example, Justice Thomas's opinion in United States v. Baker Hughes,
Inc., 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
89. 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
90. 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
91. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
92. 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991).
93. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distri-
bution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 6 (1981).
94. See, e.g., Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
95. See, e.g., Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 721-25 (1988);
McKenzie v. Mercy Hosp., 854 F.2d 365, 367-68 (10th Cir. 1988).
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form, would allow the courts to reach an economically correct result via
a superior path.
I Conference between the Senate and the House has not yet begun.
Which of the two competing bills, if either, actually gets passed and
signed into law remains to be seen. If H.R. 1470 ultimately prevails, one
can expect the antitrust revolution to continue unabated. If S.B. 429
becomes law, tension will continue to exist between the Court and Con-
gress creating additional uncertainties in antitrust law.
VI. CONCLUSION
The antitrust law of the Tenth Circuit, like that of the Supreme
Court, has changed dramatically over the past few decades. One can
expect the Court to continue its emphasis on economic efficiency and
consumer welfare for the foreseeable future. The Supreme Court shows
no inclination of diverting the Tenth Circuit from this course, and, while
somewhat less clear, neither does Congress.

